Abstract
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II. Theoretical framework 1 I motivate the empirical analysis via a simple signal extraction model. Agents ("forecasters") seek to minimize the squared error of their in ‡ation forecast f i around the actual in ‡ation rate (so that the marginal disutility of the forecast error increases with the magnitude of the error):
The private sector agents observe the central bank's public signal (a combination of its public forecasts, statements and analysis), C , and also observe their own private signal i .
Each signal is noisy:
and the precision of the public and private signals is denoted, respectively, as: 
:
Agents therefore optimally weight the two signals according to their relative precision:
5 Romer and Romer (2000) analyze whether central bank forecasts (speci…cally, the Federal Reserve's forecasts that are published only with a 5 year lag) are actually superior to the professional forecasts of the private sector, and they …nd persuasive evidence that this is the case ( > ). In fact, the Fed's unpublished forecasts are so good that if the private sector forecasters had access to them they would place no weight on their own forecasts. This is not to say that private sector forecasts are themselves bad: Ang, Bakaert, and Wai (2005) …nd that, in the United States, in ‡ation forecasts from surveys (from both professional and nonprofessional forecasters) are better predictors of future in ‡ation than model-based forecasts or implied forward in ‡ation from …nancial market data.
Then the expected mean square forecast error (a measure of the forecast inaccuracy) is given by:
In order to take this relation to the data, I introduce some identifying assumptions: (a) that the precision of the private signals is constant, for each forecaster i, over the two year time period covered in the empirical section; and (b) and that the precision of the public signal depends, over the same two year period, only on some country-speci…c factor and whether the central bank of country j has adopted in ‡ation targeting (IT = f0; 1g): and hence:
Linearizing the interaction e¤ect around V were not in the sample at the time of adoption (even if they later joined the sample). The dating is extremely clear for some countries; for others there is some controversy as to the precise month that IT was adopted. 8 The forecasts, although they are collected monthly or bimonthly, refer to calendar years rather than a 12-month-ahead moving window. As an example, the "next year" forecasts from January 1991 through December 1991 are all for same 12-month period ending in December 1992. the empirical counterpart of equation (10) is given by:
To test equation (11) I estimate the following regression:
where D T is a dummy variable for the "treatment"(IT adoption). (or the following 12-month period) and which had not adopted IT previously. 11 Figure 1 10 shows the distribution of the propensity score within the treatment group and the three 11 control groups (the latter generated according to the methodology outlined in the following 12 paragraphs), con…rming that the treatment and control samples are similar in terms of 13 prior characteristics as measured by the propensity score. (according to the propensity score) from controls that have not already been matched.
23
11 As it turns out, this aspect of the matching strategy results in no controls drawn from countries that subsequently (in the period covered by our data) adopted IT. This is likely due to the fact that countries that adopted IT generally did so fairly soon after they appeared in the dataset (with advanced countries adopting IT sooner but also appearing in the dataset earlier).
12 Observations are frequency weighted (for control groups 1 and 3). according to the propensity score (matching with replacement).
13
The appendix provides a full account of the matching algorithms used in the paper. Table   14 2 provides summary statistics (means with standard deviations in parentheses) for the 15 treatment and three control groups. The treatment and three control groups are detailed in 16   Table 3 .
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the data will exhibit mean reversion.
particularly poor quality, compared with their average performance, and these forecasters but that forecasters'fundamental ability is re ‡ected in the accuracy of both forecasts, then 17 this should ful…ll the relevancy and exogeneity requirements of a "good"instrument.
The second instrument is based on the observation that higher in ‡ation also tends to be 13 Actual (next year) GDP growth data are taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. Some gaps in the data are …lled in using data from the IMF's World Economic Outlook database.
14 The orthogonality assumption can be motivated by invoking the classical dichotomy between real and nominal variables. However, to the extent that forecasters expect some short-term positive relationship between output growth and in ‡ation (i.e., via some kind of Phillips curve), this condition may be violated. and from the full pool of control episodes. 16 The relationship appears to be negative for all 10 episodes (due to mean reversion), but there is evidence for an additional negative e¤ect
11
(conditional on the initial forecast error) due to IT adoption, as predicted. The next section
12
provides a formal econometric analysis of this e¤ect, paying attention to endogeneity issues.
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B. Matching results
15
The results of estimating equation (12) are presented in Since shocks to forecast accuracy should, at least in theory, lead forecasters to over-and underestimate in ‡ation with equal probability, f ij 0 should not be correlated with e ij 0 . 16 A common support for V 0 is imposed for IT and non-IT adoption episodes. In addition, outliers (de…ned as those with an absolute change in the in ‡ation forecast error j V j in excess of 10 percent) are also dropped. The sample includes 197 observations from IT adoption episodes and 2,048 observations from control episodes. The results are similar if the sample is not truncated to exclude outliers. third uses the IV strategy (two-stage least squares, 2SLS). Since advanced as well as 1 emerging market economies are included in the sample a dummy for advanced countries is 2 included in each speci…cation. The problem is likely to be particularly acute in our data since the observations from the 10 same "group"(de…ned over episode and country) are based on forecasts of the same 11 variable. All results therefore report clustered standard errors. 17 For the purposes of this paper, the "advanced" countries in the dataset are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
18 For Table 5 provides some robustness checks, replicating Table 4 for two placebo datasets.
5
Panel A replicates Table 4 using data for IT adoption countries with the adoption window 6 shifted to be 12 months earlier than in reality, and matching controls according to this 7 placebo data. 20 There is no statistically signi…cant evidence for a conditional or "e¤ect"from the placebo.
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Note that since the sample size is greater than that for the genuine data in this latter 13 placebo experiment, but lower in the …rst placebo experiment, di¤erences in data coverage 14 seem unlikely to explain the di¤erence between the genuine and the placebo regressions.
15
Table 5 therefore provides strong evidence that the results in Table 4 are not due to chance The IV estimates (with clustered residuals) pass tests for instrument relevance (using the Anderson canonical correlations LR statistic) and exogeneity (Hansen's J statistic used for the Hansen-Sargan overidenti…cation test). They also pass Stock and Yogo's tests for weak instruments based on 2SLS bias and size (although these tests strictly require homoskedastic residuals; see Stock and Yogo, 2002; Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002) . Test statistics and associated p-values or critical values are shown at the bottom of Table 4 . 20 Note that the …rst adoption episode (Canada) drops out of the sample due to data constraints. 21 The results from Panel B additionally suggest that IT adoption involves a one-time transparency gain rather than a gradual process that delivers additional gains in the period following IT adoption. This also provides some backing for the idea that the e¤ect identi…ed in the data derives from increased transparency rather than credibility, since the latter is likely to accrue over time whereas the former could be instantaneous. 23 Even in this case the p-value associated with the IV estimates (.122) indicates borderline statistical signi…cance. The reason for the large e¤ect in this case is that Venezuela accounts for more than 20 percent of the total (weighted) controls under the "best country" matching algorithm.
instrumenting for the initial forecast accuracy. However, the estimated conditional e¤ect of 1 IT adoption is not eliminated by adopting this IV strategy: if anything, it is strengthened.
2
I interpret these results as strong evidence that IT does indeed enhance transparency. However, further work is needed to establish whether these results hold in the speci…c case observations with a ps value outside the support of ps in the control group are dropped).
15
Algorithm 1: nearest-neighbor matching (with replacement)
16
Observations are ordered randomly. For each treatment observation, the nearest neighbor
17
(least absolute distance in terms of ps) drawn from within the same episode group is chosen 18 as the control observation (if there is a tie, the …rst available observation is chosen).
19
Matching is undertaken with replacement, so that some controls appear as repeated 20 observations in the dataset (weighted according to frequency to give an e¤ective dataset 21 size of 332).
22
Algorithm 2: one-to-one matching (without replacement)
The probit regression has a 2 (8) statistic of 87.6 [p-value=0.000] and a pseudo-R 2 of .07. As one might expect, the four right-hand-side variables associated with forecasts of in ‡ation are more correlated with the IT adoption decision (re ‡ected in higher z-statistics) than their counterparts derived from output growth forecasts.
1 that there is a unique correspondence between the 166 control and 166 treatment 2 observations (once a match has been made, the control observation is removed from the 3 pool of potential controls before the match for the next treatment observation is sought).
4
Algorithm 3: nearest-neighbor matching (with replacement) from the "best" 5 available country or countries only 6
Step 1 replicates algorithm 1.
7
Step 2: pick the "best"country as that with the highest number of (frequency weighted) 8 matches in step 1. If there is a tie (as for one episode in our data) pick both countries.
9
Now repeat the matching algorithm (again, matching with replacement according to ps), 10 using only forecasters from these best countries as the pool of potential controls. Table 5 . Placebo Regressions 
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